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Abstract
This paper analyses the problem represented by the presence of
speculative bubbles on asset prices in general equilibrium models.
The main results concerning the existence of solutions in intertem-
poral general equilibrium models are summarized, then the specific
problem of asset pricing is discussed. In particular, the theoretical
results concerning the existence of speculative bubbles on asset prices
are presented, together with the results that can be obtained through
a new approach, based on Euler equations. In the last part a series of
examples in which speculative bubbles on asset prices do appear are
illustrated, and the corresponding conditions that allow to exclude the
presence of such bubbles are derived. Finally, some considerations are
developed in order to match the predictions of the theory with the
empirical observations concerning the behavior of asset prices.
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1 Introduction
The theory of general equilibrium is the branch of economic theory that
studies the interactions between demand and supply of the different goods in
the different markets in order to determine the prices of these goods (while
the partial equilibrium analysis considers only the relations between demand
and supply of a specific good and the price of the same good).
In general equilibrium analysis some simplifications are usually intro-
duced, in particular it is assumed that:
• markets are competitive and individuals are optimizing;
• there is no production (at least in first approximation), agents have
fixed endowments of the goods and they must determine only the quan-
tities to exchange (pure exchange economy).
One of the central features of modern economics is then the introduction
of time and uncertainty, and the consequent attempt to analyse an environ-
ment characterized by the presence of these elements. The main consequence
for the behaviour of individuals is that they have only a limited ability to
make decisions in such an environment; with reference to the theory of gen-
eral equilibrium, in particular, this implies that, when agents have limited
knowledge and ability to face uncertainty, they trade sequentially (i.e. pe-
riods by periods) and use a system of contracts which involve only limited
commitments into the future.
The traditional Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model (whose objec-
tive is the study of the allocation of resources achievable through a system
of markets and whose central result is that, when there are markets and as-
sociated prices for all goods and services in the economy, no externalities or
public goods, and no informational asymmetries, then competitive markets
allocate resources efficiently) can be adapted to take into account the pres-
ence of time and uncertainty, assuming the existence, at the initial date, of
a complete set of contingent markets (i.e. a market for each good produced
or consumed in every possible future contingency). Nevertheless, this is an
idealization that is not realistic (since the individuals do not have full knowl-
edge of all possible future events and the society cannot costlessy monitor
and enforce the commitments of agents), and for this reason it is necessary to
consider an extension of this model, introducing a sequence of spot markets
(for the exchange of goods and services) and a sequence of financial markets
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(in which contracts that allow to transfer resources across time are negoti-
ated); typically, there is a limited number of these markets, i.e. there is a
situation of incomplete markets.
The equilibrium solution of these models (if it exists) gives the values
of prices and quantities (of the goods and of the financial activities) in cor-
respondence of which the individuals solve their optimization problem and
the (real and financial) markets clear (i.e. demand equals supply on these
markets). A first important problem is therefore represented by the analysis
of conditions that guarantee the existence of solutions in this kind of models.
These models can then be used to analyse the issue of asset pricing, and
in particular the relation between the equilibrium price of an asset and the
stream of future dividends on which the asset represents a claim. What
emerges is that, while in the finite-horizon case the equilibrium price equals
the fundamental value of the asset (i.e. the discounted sum of future divi-
dends), in the infinite-horizon case this is not necessarily true (in particular,
it is possible for the price to be larger than the fundamental value, and in this
case the price of the asset is said to involve a speculative bubble). A second
important question is therefore represented by the analysis of conditions that
allow to exclude the presence of such bubble components, together with the
study concerning the fragility of this phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the problem of
existence of solutions in intertemporal general equilibrium models. Since
the literature on this argument is very extensive, and in the light also of
the results discussed in the following Section, this analysis is limited to the
(relatively) simplest case, the one in which the economy is characterized by
discrete time periods and a finite number of states of nature in each period.
In such a framework, the model with contingent markets, the model with
spot and financial markets with finite horizon and then the model with spot
and financial markets with infinite horizon are considered, and the corre-
sponding results in terms of existence of solutions are derived. The main
conclusion is that, even if in the passage from an economy with contingent
markets to an economy with spot and financial markets and, in this economy,
from the finite-horizon case to the infinite-horizon case, something is ”lost”
in the proof of existence of equilibrium, nevertheless a form of existence is
always guaranteed. The model is therefore consistent, and it can be used to
explain something of the economy we are dealing with. In particular, this
kind of models can be used to investigate the problem of asset pricing, and
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the relation between the price of the assets and the stream of dividends to
which they give rise. This is the question considered in Section 3, with par-
ticular reference to the phenomenon of speculative bubbes that can emerge in
infinite-horizon incomplete-market economies. More specifically, the results
deriving from some models recently proposed are compared with those that
can be obtained through a new approach, based on Euler equations. In this
case the main conclusion is that, in the models considered, speculative bub-
bles represent a fragile phenomenon. The occurrence of speculative bubbles
as a very special circumstance is shown by means of a series of examples in
Section 4, where the use of the Euler equations’ approach also allows to show
how the presence of bubbles on asset prices is linked to the violation of spe-
cific conditions. While, in the light of the theoretical contributions presented,
the phenomenon of speculative bubbles can be considered as marginal, the
real world is often characterized by the occurrence of speculative episodes
in which bubbles do appear. For this reason, Section 5 derives some final
considerations that try to explain the mechanism that produces these results
and that allow to reconcile the conclusions of the theory with the empirical
observations.
2 Existence of solutions in general equilib-
rium models
The questions considered in the analysis of general equilibrium models are
three:
• existence: it is fundamental to ensure the coherence of the structure of
the model and the presence of a solution (otherwise it is useless);
• optimality: it allows to evaluate the efficiency of the underlying market
structure as a mechanism for the allocation of resources;
• determinacy (local uniqueness): it is essential for comparative statics
analysis (how the equilibrium changes when certain parameters of the
model vary).
This Section focuses in particular on the question of existence. Further-
more, the analysis considers the simplest case, that of a pure exchange econ-
omy, with discrete time periods and a finite number of states of the world at
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each date. In this context, the first step is represented by the study of a model
with complete contingent markets, then the analysis can be extended to the
case of a model with spot and financial markets, both in the finite-horizon
case and in the infinite-horizon case.
2.1 The model with contingent markets
The standard static model of general equilibrium (Arrow (1951), Debreu
(1952), Arrow-Debreu (1954)) assumes that there exists a market for each
good and that all goods are traded simultaneously. This model can be gener-
alized to a setting that includes the presence of time and uncertainty (Arrow
(1953), Debreu (1959)), defining the notion of contingent commodity:
Definition 1 A contingent commodity is a contract that promises the future
delivery of one unit of a particular good if a particular state of nature will
occur.
If there is a complete set of such contingent contracts (one for each good
in each possible state of nature) we have the idealyzed situation of complete
contingent markets. In this way the model with time and uncertainty can
be reduced to the model without uncertainty (considering the same good
available in different states of nature as different goods), and in this model
all the decisions are taken at the initial date (t = 0). The simplest case is
represented by an exchange economy with two periods; the results can then
be generalized to an economy that extends over T periods (with T finite).
2.1.1 Two-period exchange economy
In this case the economy consists of:
- a finite number I of agents (i = 1, 2, ..., I);
- a finite number L of goods (l = 1, 2, ..., L);
- two periods (t = 0, 1);
- S possible states of nature (s = 1, 2, ..., S) at time t = 1 (if time t = 0
is denoted as state s = 0 there are in total S + 1 states of nature);
- commodity space Rn with n = L(S + 1);
- initial endowment of the L goods in each state of nature for agent i
given by wi = (wi0, w
i
1, ..., w
i
S);
- utility function for agent i given by ui : Rn+ → R defined over consump-
tion bundles xi = (xi0, x
i
1, ..., x
i
S).
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The characteristics of agent i are therefore summarized by a utility func-
tion and an endowment vector (ui, wi), and it is assumed that they satisfy
some regularity conditions (smooth preferences) (in particular ui is of class
C∞ and preferences are strictly monotone).
The collection of I agents with their characteristics (u,w) = (u1, ..., uI , w1, ..., wI)
constitutes the exchange economy E(u,w), and an allocation of resources for
this economy is a vector of consumption bundles x = (x1, x2, ..., xI) ∈ RnI+ .
A contingent contract for good l in state s is a contract that promises
to deliver one unit of good l if the state of nature s will occur and nothing
otherwise. The corresponding price, payable in t = 0, is Psl and if there is
a complete set of such contracts each agent i can sell his endowment wi =
(wi0, w
i
1, ..., w
i
S) at prices P = (P0, P1, ..., PS) with Ps = (Ps1, Ps2, ..., PsL) to
obtain Pwi, and he can purchase any consumption vector xi = (xi0, x
i
1, ..., x
i
S)
that satisfies the constraint:
Pxi =
SX
s=0
Psx
i
s ≤
SX
s=0
Psw
i
s = Pw
i
Since preferences are monotonic each agent will always fully spend his income,
hence the contingent market budget set of each individual is:
B(P,wi) =
©
xi ∈ Rn+ | P (xi − wi) = 0
ª
We now have the following definition of equilibrium for this economy:
Definition 2 A contingent market equilibrium for the economy E(u,w) is a
pair of allocations and prices (x, P ) such that:
(i) xi = argmax
©
ui(xi) | xi ∈ B(P,wi)ª i = 1, 2, ..., I
(ii)
PI
i=1(x
i − wi) = 0
i.e. at equilibrium each individual solves his maximization problem and,
in addition, markets clear (i.e. the total demand of each good in each state
of nature is equal to the total supply).
The fundamental result that can be obtained applying the classical ex-
istence theorem of general equilibrium theory is that the exchange economy
E(u,w) has at least one equilibrium, and moreover the allocation x is Pareto
optimal. More precisely, if EC(w) is the set of contingent market equilibrium
allocations corresponding to the parameter value w, we have the following
results:
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• existence: EC(w) 6= ∅ ∀w
• optimality: x ∈ EC(w)⇒ x is Pareto optimal ∀w
• local uniqueness: EC(w) is a finite set (hence the equilibrium is locally
unique)
2.1.2 Stochastic exchange economy
The previous model can then be extended to an economy with a finite number
of periods t = 1, 2, ..., T . In this case the uncertainty is modelled with an
event-tree and the economy consists of:
- a finite set of states of nature S = {1, 2, ..., S};
- a collection of partitions of S given by F = (F0, F1, ..., FT ) where F0 = S,
FT = {{1} , {2} , ..., {S}} and Ft is finer than Ft−1 for all t = 1, 2, ..., T (this
expresses the idea that information is revealed gradually and increases over
time);
- the set of nodes D = ∪Tt=0Ft.
Given the setting described by the event tree D and the associated com-
modity space C(D,RL) that consists of all functions f : D→ RL, the econ-
omy can be described as in the two-period model. In particular, each con-
sumer i has an endowment described by the process wi = (wi(ξ), ξ ∈ D)
and a utility function ui : C+ → R . Given the information structure F ,
the associated stochastic exchange economy is denoted by E(u,w, F ) and,
defining a process of contingent prices P , the contingent market budget set
of each individual is:
B(P,wi) =
©
xi ∈ C+ | P (xi − wi) = 0
ª
A contingent market equilibrium is defined as for an economy with 2 periods,
and also in this case the results of existence and Pareto optimality of equi-
librium hold. With a system of contingent markets, therefore, an economy
with T periods behaves exactly as an economy with 2 periods.
2.2 The model with spot markets and financial mar-
kets with finite horizon
The model with contingent markets presented above is not realistic, hence it
is possible to consider a different formulation that takes into account the fact
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that in reality markets have a sequential structure (Radner (1972)). This
is done introducing a system of spot and financial markets and describing
trading on these markets as a sequential process of equilibrium over time.
Also in this case it is possible to examine first of all an economy with 2
periods and then an economy with T periods (with T finite); finally, the
analysis is applied to an economy that extends over an infinite horizon.
2.2.1 Two-period exchange economy
In this model the sequential structure of markets is represented by:
- a system of spot markets for each of the L goods at time t = 0 and in
each state s at time t = 1;
- a system of financial markets that provide instruments that enable
agents to redistribute income across the different states of nature.
In this case p = (p0, p1, ..., pS) ∈ Rn++ is the vector of spot prices, where
ps = (ps1, ps2, ..., psL) and psl denotes the price, measured in units of account,
payable in state s for one unit of good l. The essential distinction between
a spot market in state s and a contingent market for state s is that is that
in the former the payment is made at date 1 in state s (if s ≥ 1), while in
the latter the payment is made at date 0 (as a consequence, in the case of
contingent markets there is a single budget constraint, while in the case of
spot markets there are S+1 budget constraints). We then assume that there
are J financial activities (real assets), where the following definition holds:
Definition 3 A real asset j is a contract which promises to deliver a vector
of the L goods:
Ajs = (A
j
s1, A
j
s2, ..., A
j
sL) ∈ RL s = 1, 2, ..., S
in each state s at date 1.
A real asset is therefore characterized by a date-1 commodity vector Aj =
(Aj1, A
j
2, ..., A
j
S) ∈ RLS and the revenue (in units of account) that it gives in
state s is proportional to the spot price ps:
V js = ps ·Ajs s = 1, 2, ..., S
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The asset j can be purchased at price qj at time 0 and it gives a return
V j = (V j1 , V
j
2 , ..., V
j
S ) at time 1. The (column) vectors V
j can be combined
to form the date-1 matrix of returns (of dimension S × J):
V =
£
V 1 · · ·V J¤ =


V 11 · · · V J1
...
. . .
...
V 1S · · · V JS


that can also be expressed in the form:
V = V (p1, A) =


p1A
1
1 · · · p1AJ1
...
. . .
...
pSA
1
S · · · pSAJS


where p1 = (p1, p2, ..., pS) ∈ RLS is the date-1 vector of spot prices. The
matrix V can also be written in the form:
V (p1, A) =


p1 0 · · · 0
0 p2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · pS




A11 · · · AJ1
...
...
...
...
A1S · · · AJS


and since real assets are not influenced by the price level (in the sense that,
for instance, doubling the spot prices in state s doubles their income), the
financial structure of the economy can be summarized by the matrix:
A =
£
A1 · · ·AJ¤ =


A11 · · · AJ1
...
. . .
...
A1S · · · AJS


of dimension LS × J .
The economy consisting of I individuals with characteristics (u,w) =
(u1, ..., uI , w1, ..., wI) who trade J securities with date-1 payoffs given by the
matrix V and with real asset structure given by the matrix A is denoted by
E(u,w,A).
The matrix V generates the subspace of income transfers (or market
subspace) hV i , i.e. the subspace of RS spanned by the J columns of V :
hV i = ©τ ∈ RS | τ = V z, z ∈ RJª
and we have the following definition:
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Definition 4 If hV i = RS (i.e. the market subspace has maximal dimen-
sion), then the asset structure is called complete (i.e. there are complete
financial markets), otherwise the asset structure is called incomplete (i.e.
there are incomplete financial markets).
This is a fundamental definition for all subsequent analysis. Since z rep-
resents a portfolio of the J assets, the fact that hV i = RS means that every
possible state-dependent income τ ∈ RS can be obtained by means of an
appropriate portfolio in the economy, and in this sense financial markets are
complete, otherwise financial markets are incomplete (this is the situation
that typically can be observed in reality).
The completeness of the asset strucure requires that dim hV i = S , in
this case the matrix V has full rank and we must have J ≥ S (with S
assets that have linearly independent payoffs); as a consequence, whenever
J < S markets are incomplete. On the other hand, if J ≥ S and rank
V = S, it is not possible to say unambiguously that markets are complete
(because completeness is relative to a particular system of spot prices p1 =
(p1, p2, ..., pS)); what can be proved is that in this case markets are generally
(or potentially) complete (i.e. markets are complete for systems of spot prices
that belong to an open set of full measure). This turns out to be fundamental
in the discussion of the existence of equilibrium for this kind of models.
To introduce this concept of equilibrium it is possible to observe that if
zi = (zi1, z
i
2, ..., z
i
J) ∈ RJ denotes the number of units of each of the J assets
purchased by agent i (where zij < 0 represents a short-sale of the asset) there
are S + 1 budget constraints given by:½
p0(x
i
0 − wi0) = −qzi
ps(x
i
s − wis) = Vszi s = 1, 2, ...S
where q = (q1, q2, ..., qJ) and Vs = (V 1s , V
2
s , ..., V
J
s ) is the row s of the matrix
V . By defining the full matrix of returns (i.e. date-0 and date-1 returns) as:
W =W (q, V ) =
·
−q
V
¸
=


−q1 · · · −qJ
V 11 · · · V J1
...
. . .
...
V 1S · · · V JS


and for p ∈ Rn, xi ∈ Rn (where n = L(S + 1)) the box product:
p¤xi = (p0xi0, p1xi1, ..., pSxiS)
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the budget set of individual i can be written in compact form as:
B(p, q, wi) = ©xi ∈ Rn+ | p¤(xi − wi) =W (q, V )ziª
and in this case the agent chooses a pair (xi, zi) consisting of a vector of
consumption xi and a vector of securities (a portfolio) zi. We now have the
following definition of equilibrium:
Definition 5 A spot-financial market equilibrium for the economy E(u,w,A)
is a pair of allocations and prices ((x, z), (p, q)) such that:
(i) (xi, zi) satisfy xi = argmax {ui(xi) | xi ∈ B(p, q, wi)} and p¤(xi −
wi) =W (q, V )zi i = 1, 2, ..., I
(ii)
PI
i=1(x
i − wi) = 0
(iii)
PI
i=1 z
i = 0
Again, this means that at equilibrium individuals solve their optimization
problems and markets clear, i.e. demand equals supply (in particular it is
assumed that the total net supply of assets is zero, and for this reason the
market-clearing condition on financial markets is expressed by (iii)).
While an economy E(u,w) with the characteristics described previously
has always a contingent market equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in
the case of spot and financial markets, where the possibility of non-existence
of equilibrium arises (Hart (1975)). This is due to the fact that the rank of
the return matrix may change when the prices (p, q) vary, determining dis-
continuities in the demand of the individuals that may lead to non-existence
of equilibrium (a particular case where this doesn’t happen and the return
matrix doesn’t drop rank is the one in which the only assets in the economy
are short-lived numeraire securities, that will be considered in the version
of the model with infinite horizon). For this reason, the results obtained in
the model with spot and financial markets are weaker than those obtained
in the model with contingent markets. In fact, these results (Magill-Shafer
(1985), Duffie-Shafer (1985, 1986)) hold generically (i.e. in an open set of
full measure, and this means that the values of the parameters for which the
results don’t hold represent a set with zero measure), and they are differ-
ent considering generically (or potentially) complete markets or incomplete
markets.
In the case of generically complete markets (the assets with linearly in-
dependent returns must be equal in number to the states of nature, and this
requires J ≥ S), if we denote by EA(w) the set of spot-financial market
equilibrium allocations for the parameter value w, we have:
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• existence: EA(w) 6= ∅ ∀w ∈ Ω0 (generic set);
• optimality: x ∈ EA(w)⇒ x is Pareto optimal ∀w ∈ Ω00 (generic set);
• local uniqueness: EA(w) is a finite set (hence the equilibrium is locally
unique).
Hence, when markets are potentially complete the results of classical gen-
eral equilibrium theory extend generically to an economy with spot and
financial markets.
In the case of incomplete markets, (i.e. J < S, there are less assets than
states of nature and therefore there are limited possibilities to redistribute
income across the different states of the world) only existence (and local
uniqueness) continue to hold (generically), while the optimality of equilib-
rium allocations doesn’t hold any more.
2.2.2 Stochastic exchange economy
As for an economy with contingent markets, also for an economy with spot
and financial markets it is possible to extend the previous model to the
case with many time periods t = 1, 2, ..., T . As before, the uncertainty is
modelled by means of an event-tree, furthermore it is possible to consider J
assets issued (for simplicity) at time 0, where asset j is characterized by a
function Aj : D → RL and one unit of the asset held at the initial node ξ0
promises to deliver the commodity vector Aj(ξ) at node ξ.
If A(ξ) =
£
A1(ξ), A2(ξ), ..., AJ(ξ)
¤
, ξ ∈ D and p ∈ C+ is a stochastic
spot price process, then:
V j(ξ) = p(ξ)Aj(ξ) ξ ∈ D
is the dividend paid by asset j at node ξ. A security price process, then, is
a function q : D → RJ and q(ξ) is the vector of prices of the J assets at
node ξ (with q(ξ) = 0 if ξ is a terminal node). Finally, the trading strategy
of agent i is a function zi : D→ RJ and zi(ξ) is the portfolio of the J assets
purchased by individual i at node ξ after the previous portfolio has been
liquidated (with zi(ξ) = 0 if ξ is a terminal node).
In this case the budget constraint is given by:½
p(ξ0)(xi(ξ0)− wi(ξ0)) = −q(ξ0)zi(ξ0)
p(ξ)(xi(ξ)− wi(ξ)) = [p(ξ)A(ξ) + q(ξ)] zi(ξ−)− q(ξ)zi(ξ) , ∀ξ ∈ DÂξ0
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where it is assumed that the portfolio purchased at any node ξ is sold at
each immediate successor of ξ and that a new portfolio is then purchased.
The payoff obtained on the investment zij(ξ
−) in asset j at the predecessor
ξ− of the node ξ consists of two parts, the dividend pj(ξ)Aj(ξ)zij(ξ
−) and
the capital value qj(ξ)zij(ξ
−) (that derives from the sale of the portfolio at
node ξ). The latter is the new term introduced by extending the model to
the multiperiod case (while it is absent at the initial and terminal dates, that
are the only dates that appear in the two-period model). We now have the
following definition of equilibrium:
Definition 6 A spot-financial market equilibrium for the economy E(u,w,A)
is a pair of allocations and prices ((x, z), (p, q)) such that:
(i) (xi, zi) solves the maximization problem of individuals subject to the
budget constraint;
(ii)
PI
i=1(x
i − wi) = 0
(iii)
PI
i=1 z
i = 0
With reference to the results that can be obtained for this model, as for
a two-period economy in the case of generically complete markets we have
(generic) existence, optimality and local uniqueness of equilibrium, while
in the case of incomplete markets only existence (and local uniqueness) of
equilibrium is preserved, while the equilibrium is no longer Pareto optimal.
2.3 The model with spot markets and financial mar-
kets with infinite horizon
The previous model can be extended to the infinite horizon case (Magill-
Quinzii (1994, 1996)), in order to make it more realistic, since economic
activity is a process that has no natural terminal horizon. In this case a new
problem is represented by the fact that, if agents are permitted to borrow,
they may try to postpone indefinitely the repayment of their debts from one
period to the next (the so-called Ponzi scheme), and if this happens there is
no solution to an agent’s decision problem an hence an equilibrium cannot
exist. To avoid this problem it is necessary to impose a debt constraint.
Also in this extension of the model the economy is described by means
of an event-tree structure (exactly as in the model with finite horizon), in
particular we have (considering bounded sequences):
- set of commodities over the event-tree given byD×L = {(ξ, l) | ξ ∈ D, l ∈ L};
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- initial endowment of individual i given by the processwi = (wi(ξ, l), (ξ, l) ∈
D× L);
- consumption of individual i given by the process xi = (xi(ξ, l), (ξ, l) ∈
D× L);
- prices of the goods given by the process p = (p(ξ, l), (ξ, l) ∈ D× L);
- set of the assets issued at node ξ given by J(ξ), set of all assets given
by J;
- dividends of the assets at nodes after the node of issue given by the
process pA = (p(ξ0)A(ξ0), ξ0 successor of ξ), that is the value at spot prices
p(ξ0) of a bundle A(ξ0) of the L goods;
- prices of the assets given by the process q = (q(ξ, j), (ξ, j) ∈ D× J);
- portfolio of individual i given by the process zi = (zi(ξ, j), (ξ, j) ∈
D× J).
A distinction that can be made is between short-lived assets (they are
traded only at the nodes of issue and pay dividends only at the immediate
successors of these nodes) and long-lived assets (in particular infinite-lived
assets if they are traded at each node after the node of issue). In the case
of short-lived assets the hypotheses necessary to prove the existence of the
equilibrium are slightly weaker than the hypotheses in the general case.
If %= (%1,%2, ...,%I) and w = (w1, w2, ..., wI) represent the preference
ordering and the initial endowments of the I individuals and A the generic
security structure, the economy considered, defined on the event-tree D, is
represented by E∞(D,%, w,A).
The essential hypotheses used to prove the existence of the equilibrium
are:
- for each node there is a finite number of immediate successors;
- the aggregate endowment of the economy is bounded above;
- agents are impatient (their preferences are continuous in a particular
topology, theMackey topology), i.e. they prefer early to distant consumption;
- the degree of impatience of agents is bounded below by a positive number
(i.e. it doesn’t vanish asymptotically) and this lower bound is equal for all
nodes;
- there is a borrowing constraint which limits the amount of debt of the
agents; this debt constraint can be explicit:
q(ξ)zi(ξ) ≥ −M ∀ξ ∈ D (1)
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(where M is a positive number, in this case at each date the agent’s debt
cannot exceed the bound M), or it can be implicit:
(qzi) = (q(ξ)zi(ξ), ξ ∈ D) ∈ l∞(D) (2)
(where l∞ is the space of bounded sequences, hence the debt cannot grow
without bound), or it can be introduced through a transversality condition:
lim
T→∞
X
ξ0∈DT (ξ)
πi(ξ0)q(ξ0)zi(ξ0) = 0 ∀ξ ∈ D (3)
(where DT (ξ) is the set, at time T , of the nodes that are successors of ξ, and
πi are the state prices) - this condition states that the present value of the
debt of each individual must be asymptotically zero -.
Each agent, therefore, has a budget set expressed by the condition:
p(ξ)(xi(ξ)− wi(ξ)) = [p(ξ)A(ξ) + q(ξ)] zi(ξ−)− q(ξ)zi(ξ)
and, furthermore, by one of conditions (1), (2), (3). The following definition
of equilibrium now holds:
Definition 7 An equilibrium for the economy E∞(D,%, w,A) is a pair of
allocations and prices ((x, z), (p, q)) such that:
(i) (xi, zi) solves the maximization problem of the individuals subject to
the budget constraint;
(ii)
PI
i=1(x
i − wi) = 0
(iii)
PI
i=1 z
i = 0
For the economy considered it is possible to prove the existence of the
equilibrium for all values of the parameters that characterize it in the case
of a particular asset structure, composed only by short-lived numeraire se-
curities (to this end it is sufficient to consider an economy with the same
characteristics as E∞(D,%, w,A) but with finite horizon ET (D,%, w,A), for
which it is known that an equilibrium exists for each value of the parameters,
then it is possible to consider the limit for T tending to∞ and to show that
the limit of the equilibrium of this economy ET is an equilibrium for the limit
economy E∞).
If the economy is charachterized by the presence of a general asset struc-
ture, with long-lived assets, a further problem arises because in this case
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the return matrix may change rank when the prices (p, q) vary, causing non-
existence of equilibrium (this problem doesn’t arise if there are only short-
lived numeraire securities). What it is possible to show in this situation is
that the equilibrium exists for a dense set of economies (i.e. if the economy
E∞(D,%, w,A) doesn’t have an equilibrium, then for every ε > 0 there ex-
ists a financial structure A0 in the ball of radius ε around A such that the
economy E∞(D,%, w,A0) has an equilibrium).
In conclusion, the results obtained with reference to the question of ex-
istence of the equilibrium in the models considered can be summarized as
follows:
• model with contingent markets: existence of the equilibrium (both in
an economy with 2 periods and in an economy with T periods);
• model with spot and financial markets with finite horizon: existence of
the equilibrium for a generic set of economies (both in an economy
with 2 periods and in an economy with T periods);
• model with spot and financial markets with infinite horizon: existence
of the equilibrium in the case of short-lived numeraire assets, existence
of the equilibrium for a dense set of economies in the case of a general
financial structure.
In the transition from the model with contingent markets to the model
with spot and financial markets and, within this model, from the finite hori-
zon case to the infinite horizon case, something is ”lost” in terms of exis-
tence of solutions. Nevertheless, the existence of the equilibrium (even if in
a weaker form) is preserved; the model is therefore consistent, and can be
used to explain something of the economy under study. In particular, it is
possible to obtain indications concerning the equilibrium prices of the assets,
and this is the subject of the following Section.
3 Asset pricing and speculative bubbles
The model with spot and financial markets introduced above can be used
to investigate the relation between the equilibrium price of an asset and
the stream of future dividends to which this asset represents a claim. With
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reference to this aspect, the theorem of absence of arbitrage opportunities on
financial markets hold. According to this theorem (in the finite horizon case),
the utility maximization problem of individual i considered in the definition
of equilibrium has a solution if and only if q is a no-arbitrage asset price,
where the following definition holds:
Definition 8 q ∈ RJ is a no-arbitrage asset price if there does not exist a
portfolio z ∈ RJ such that W (q, V )z ≥ 0 (and not null), i.e. a portfolio such
that:
V z ≥ 0 qz ≤ 0
with at least one strict inequality. This means that it does not exist an in-
vestment strategy which gives a positive payoff in at least one state with non-
negative payoffs in all remaining states.
In the case of a two-period economy the absence of arbitrage opportunities
implies the existence of a present value vector π = (π0,π1, ...,πS) (whose
components are positive state prices, that represent the present value at
date 0 of one unit of income in state s) such that πW = 0, i.e.:
π0qj =
SX
s=1
πsV js j = 1, 2, ..., J
so that (since π0 can be normalized to 1) the price of each asset is equal to the
present value of its future dividend stream. In the case of a T -period economy,
similarly, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies the existence of a
present value process π : D → R++ (whose components are positive state
prices) such that:
π(ξ)q(ξ) =
X
ξ0∈ξ+
π(ξ0) [p(ξ0)A(ξ0) + q(ξ0)] ∀ξ ∈ D−
and therefore the value at date 0 of the price of an asset at node ξ is the
present value of its dividends and capital values over the set of immediate
successors ξ+. Solving this system of equations recursively and using the
terminal condition q(ξ) = 0,∀ξ /∈ D− (where D− is the set of non-terminal
nodes) we get:
q(ξ) =
1
π(ξ)
X
ξ0>ξ
π(ξ0)p(ξ0)A(ξ0) ∀ξ ∈ D− (4)
17
and also in this case the current value of each asset at node ξ is the present
value of its future dividend stream over all succeeding nodes ξ0 > ξ. The
right-hand side of expression (4) is the so-called fundamental value of the
asset, and hence in the finite horizon case the equilibrium price of an asset
is equal to this value. In the infinite horizon case, on the contrary, it may
happen that the equilibrium price of the asset is larger than its fundamental
value: in this case the difference represents a speculative bubble.
These are the questions addressed in the present Section. In particular,
the issue of speculative bubbles is initially studied by means of the infinite-
horizon model introduced in Section 2, then it is considered more specifically
along the lines of a recent contribution that tries to give definitive results
concerning this question. Finally, the problem is analysed following a new
approach, based on Euler equations. This approach is also used, in the next
Section, to construct and to study specific examples in which bubbles do
appear.
3.1 The model of Magill-Quinzii (1996)
The model, introduced in the previous Section, of Magill-Quinzii (1996) is
based on the problem, considered above, of the existence of an equilibrium,
but gives also indications on the existence of speculative bubbles. In partic-
ular, it is possible to observe that relation (4) remains true, in the infinite
horizon case, for finitely-lived securities, for which the terminal condition
q(ξ) = 0 holds; in the case of infinite-lived securities, on the contrary, this
condition doesn’t hold, and therefore the equality between the asset price
and the fundamental value is not guaranteed.
With reference to an infinite-horizon economy, the following definition
can then be introduced:
Definition 9 Let ((x, z), (p, q)) be an equilibrium for the economy with infi-
nite horizon E∞(D,º, w,A). The security j ∈ J is priced at its fundamental
value if, for all agents i ∈ I, we have:
q(ξ) =
1
πi(ξ)
X
ξ0>ξ
πi(ξ0)p(ξ0)A(ξ0) ∀ξ ∈ D
(where the values πi are those corresponding to prices q). If this relation is
not satisfied for some agent i ∈ I, the security j has a speculative bubble.
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The central conclusion of the model of Magill-Quinzii in terms of bubbles
distinguishes between (infinite-lived) securities in positive net supply and in
zero net supply. In particular, the following results hold:
• if an (infinite-lived) security is in positive net supply its price (under
the hypotheses of the model, in particular the existence of a uniform
lower bound to the impatience of the agents) is equal to its fundamental
value (hence there cannot be speculative bubbles on the prices of these
assets);
• if an (infinite-lived) security is in zero net supply it is always possible
to add a bubble component to the equilibrium price such that the
new price remains an equilibrium price (hence there can be speculative
bubbles on the prices of these assets).
Since securities in positive net supply (such as equity contracts) represent
an important part of the capital market, the result that on such securities
bubbles cannot arise reduces consistently the role of speculation in this class
of models, and this is the central conclusion emerging from the analysis of
the model of Magill-Quinzii.
3.2 The model of Santos-Woodford (1997)
The problem of bubbles on asset pricing can then be studied following a
contribution, due to Santos-Woodford (1997), that examines this problem
specifically, trying to make order in the field and to give a definitive theo-
retical settlement to this controversal question. The scope of the model of
Santos-Woodford is the analysis of conditions under which speculative bub-
bles are possible or not in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with
infinite horizon, spot markets for the goods and markets for securities, in
which agents have rational expectations. It is similar to the model, with
infinite horizon, analysed above, but it is more general because it considers
assets that give returns not only in terms of consumption goods but also
in terms of other securities, and furthermore it incorporates both the case
of infinite-lived agents (as in the model of Magill-Quinzii) and the case of
finitely-lived agents but with overlapping generations (not considered by the
previous model). For this reason, the model of Santos-Woodford gives results
that hold for a very general class of economies.
In this case the economy consists of:
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- an event-tree structure with a finite number of nodes ξ at each date
t = 0, 1, 2, ... (in particular there is a unique initial node and each node has a
unique immediate predecessor and a finite number of immediate successors);
- markets for goods and for securities at each node;
- endowment of consumption goods at each node given by w(ξ) ≥ 0;
- consumption of goods at each node given by x(ξ) ≥ 0 with prices p(ξ);
- securities that give a dividend in terms of consumption goods and of
other securities;
- net supply of securities at each node given by z(ξ) ≥ 0 with prices of
the securities q(ξ).
The hypotheses that are essential for the results of this model are:
-monotonicity of preferences of individuals (the preference relation is non-
decreasing on the consumption set and strictly increasing in the consumption
of at least one good traded at each node);
- existence of impatience of agents with positive lower bound on the degree
of impatience that is uniform across the nodes (this hypothesis allows to
obtain stronger results).
Given all these elements, the individual i ∈ I chooses at each node ξ a
vector of consumption goods xi(ξ) and a vector of securities zi(ξ) subject to
the budget constraints:
p(ξ)(xi(ξ)− wi(ξ)) ≤ V (ξ)zi(ξ−)− q(ξ)zi(ξ)
q(ξ)zi(ξ) ≥ −M i(ξ)
where V (ξ) is the vector of one-period returns in correspondence of node ξ
and M i(ξ) ≥ 0 represents the borrowing limit of agent i at node ξ. Also
in this case, an equilibrium is a process that consists of pairs of allocations
and prices such that individuals maximize their utility subject to the budget
constraint and markets clear.
The next step is the characterization of the relation between the price of
a security and the value of the stream of dividends to which it represents a
claim. As noted above, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies the
existence of positive state prices π(ξ) such that:
π(ξ)q(ξ) =
X
ξ0∈ξ+
π(ξ0)V (ξ0) ∀ξ ∈ D−
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This equation has a unique solution in the case of complete markets, while
in the case of incomplete markets there are different vectors of state prices
that satisfy the relation. Iterating this expression we get:
π(ξ)q(ξ) ≥
X
ξ0∈DT (ξ)
π(ξ0)p(ξ0)A(ξ0)
where DT (ξ) denotes the nodes between dates t(ξ) and T that belong to the
subtree with root ξ. The right-hand side expression is a non-decreasing and
upper bounded series, hence it converges as T → ∞ (to a limit no greater
than the left-hand side expression) and we have:
q(ξ) ≥ 1
π(ξ)
X
ξ0>ξ
π(ξ0)p(ξ0)A(ξ0) ≥ 0
where the central term is the fundamental value of the asset. We have there-
fore:
0 ≤ f(ξ) ≤ q(ξ)
and as a consequence, differently from the finite-horizon case, in the infinite-
horizon case it is not necessarily true that q(ξ) = f(ξ). It is then possible to
define the vector of speculative bubbles:
σ(ξ) = q(ξ)− f(ξ)
that satisfies the bounds:
0 ≤ σ(ξ) ≤ q(ξ)
from which we get the result of ”impossibility of negative bubbles”.
In the case of finitely-lived securities the fundamental value is uniquely
defined (also with incomplete markets, with different state prices) and f(ξ) =
q(ξ), so that there are no bubbles. In the case of infinite-lived securities with
incomplete markets, on the contrary, there can be bubbles. Furthermore,
with incomplete markets the fundamental value may be different in corre-
spondence of different values of state prices, and in this case the so-called
ambiguous bubbles can arise.
With reference to this aspect, the fundamental conclusions of the model
are the following:
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• under the hypothesis of monotonicity of preferences and of finite ag-
gregate endowment of the economy there exists in equilibrium a state-
price process such that q(ξ) = f(ξ) for each security that is either
finitely-lived or in positive net supply (nevertheless, for securities in
positive net supply is not excluded the existence of state prices for
which q(ξ) > f(ξ), i.e. it is not excluded the presence of ambiguous
bubbles);
• considering also the hypothesis of impatience of the agents, we have
in equilibrium (regardless of the state-prices chosen) q(ξ) = f(ξ) for
each security that is either finitely lived or in positive net supply (and
therefore in this case it is excluded the presence of ambiguous bubbles).
In conclusion, if the agents have monotonic preferences, they are suffi-
ciently impatient and the aggregate endowment of the economy is finite, it is
possible to have speculative bubbles only on securities that are both infinite-
lived and in zero net supply (this is exactly the same result obtained in the
model of Magill-Quinzii). These results hold for a wide class of economies;
the conclusion is that, under quite general assumptions, there are not specu-
lative bubbles on asset prices, and the existence of such bubbles is linked to
special circumstances, so that it is a fragile phenomenon.
3.3 The approach of Euler equations
The issue of bubbles on asset pricing can also be analysed by means of a
different approach, based on the use of Euler equations and inequalities. This
approach is more limited than the one considered above (which has led to
very general models, used to deal with the problem of existence of solutions
and of speculative bubbles in a wide class of intertemporal economies), but
it is of some interest because it confirms the results on fragility of bubbles
obtained above, and it also provides a method that can be used to obtain
examples in which bubbles do appear. In this case it is no longer necessarily
true that the number of states of nature at each date is finite, hence it is
necessary to introduce in the model also a probabilistic structure.
A first step is represented by the study of a model ”a’ la Lucas” (Lucas
(1978)) that considers consumers which are identical in terms of utilities and
endowments, i.e. a model with homogeneous agents (Montrucchio-Privileggi
(2001)). The economy consists of:
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- a set I of individuals with utility function ut(x) defined on a single
non-storable consumption good for t = 0, 1, 2, ...;
- endowment of the consumption good for each agent at time t given by
wt;
- J infinite-lived assets that give a dividend dt ∈ RJ+ in terms of the
consumption good and that are held in quantity zt ∈ RJ by each agent at
time t;
- initial endowment of each asset normalized to 1, i.e. z0 = e= (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈
RJ (only securities in positive net supply are considered);
- spot markets for the consumption good and for the assets;
- prices of the assets given by qt ∈ RJ+ and price of the consumption good
given by pt = 1 (numeraire);
- uncertainty described through a probabilistic space (Ω,F, µ).
Given these elements a plan (x, z) = (xt(ω), zt(ω)) is feasible if it satisfies
the constraint:
xt(ω) + qt(ω)[zt+1(ω)− zt(ω)] ≤ dt(ω)zt(ω) + wt(ω)
according to which the expenditure in each period cannot exceed the endow-
ment of the same period, and in an economy with these characteristics (and
in which we also assume that short-selling is prohibited, i.e. individuals can-
not borrow) there exists a ”no-trade equilibrium” (as a consequence of the
fact that individuals are identical in terms of preferences and endowments),
that is an equilibrium in which agents hold their assets forever and consume
all their available wealth at each date. This equilibrium can be characterized
in the following way:
Definition 10 A no-trade equilibrium for the economy considered is a pair
of allocations and prices ((x, z), q), t = 0, 1, 2, ... such that:
(i) the price process q satisfies:
0 ≤ qt < +∞ almost surely for all t
(ii) the consumption plan x = {xt} = {dt · e+ wt} , z = {e} is optimal
with respect to all feasible consumption plans.
Is is then possible to prove that at the equilibrium the following relation
(that is a stochastic Euler inequality) must be satisfied:
u0t−1(xt−1)qt−1 ≥ Et−1[u0t(xt)(dt + qt)] for all t ≥ 1
23
(in particular it holds as an equality, for instance, when the states of nature
are finite at date t). This relation represents a necessary condition of opti-
mality in the short run and can be used to introduce the dinstinction between
the fundamental value of an asset and the bubble component, to this end it
is possible to write:
u0t−1(xt−1)qt−1 = Et−1[u
0
t(xt)(dt + qt)] + st−1
where the vectors st ≥ 0measure the deviation from the equality in the Euler
equation. Writing for simplicity u0t(xt) = πt and iterating the last equation
we get:
πtqt = Et
kX
r=1
πt+rdt+r +Et
k−1X
r=0
st+r +Et[πt+kqt+k]
and considering the limit for k that goes to ∞:
πtqt = Et
∞X
r=1
πt+rdt+r +Et
∞X
r=0
st+r + lim
k→+∞
Et[πt+kqt+k]
and also:
qt =
1
πt
Et
∞X
r=1
πt+rdt+r +
1
πt
Et
∞X
r=0
st+r +
1
πt
lim
k→+∞
Et[πt+kqt+k]
The price of the asset can therefore be decomposed into 3 components:
qt = ft +ebt + bt
where the first term of the right-hand side is the fundamental value:
ft =
1
πt
Et
∞X
r=1
πt+rdt+r
while the other two terms represent the bubble component, in particular the
second term is the bubble due to the violation of the Euler equation:
ebt = 1πtEt
∞X
r=0
st+r
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and the third term is the asymptotic bubble:
bt =
1
πt
lim
k→+∞
Et[πt+kqt+k]
The fundamental results that can be obtained in this model concerning
the existence of speculative bubbles in the economy are the following:
• the non-existence of bubbles is a generic property (in fact the set of
initial endowments for which in equilibrium there is a bubble has zero
measure);
• if the agents’ preferences exhibit uniformly bounded relative risk aver-
sion, then the pricing equilibrium is unique (without bubbles).
In conclusion, also in this case the existence of bubbles represents a fragile
phenomenon.
The next step is the extension of the model to the case of heterogeneous
agents (Montrucchio (2001)) , in this case the economy consists of:
- a set I of individuals with utility function uit(x) defined on a single
non-storable consumption good for t = 0, 1, 2, ...;
- endowment of the consumption good for agent i at time t given by wit;
- J infinite-lived assets that give a dividend dt ∈ RJ+ in terms of the
consumption good and that are held in quantity zit ∈ RJ by agent i at time
t;
- share of the total asset supply received by agent i at time 0 given by zi0,
with
P
i∈I z
i
0 = e= (1, 1, ..., 1) ∈ RJ
- spot markets for the consumption good and for the assets;
- prices of the assets given by qt ∈ RJ+ and price of the consumption good
given by pt = 1 (numeraire);
- uncertainty described through a probabilistic space (Ω,F, µ).
Each agent i maximizes his utility over time facing, in each period t, the
traditional budget constraint:
xit(ω) + qt(ω)(z
i
t+1(ω)− zit(ω)) ≤ dt(ω)zit(ω) + wit(ω)
that implies the feasibility of a consumption plan, together with a borrowing
constraint given by zit ≥ kit (where kit represents a borrowing limit, in partic-
ular if kit = 0 this means that short-selling is prohibited). For this economy
it is then possible to introduce the following definition of equilibrium:
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Definition 11 An equilibrium for the economy considered is a pair of allo-
cations and prices ((xi, zi), q), i ∈ I, t = 0, 1, 2, ... such that:
(i) the price process q satisfies:
0 ≤ qt < +∞ almost surely for all t
(ii) for every i the consumption plan xi is optimal with respect to all
feasible consumption plans;
(iii)
P
i∈I z
i
t ≤ 1 and qt
¡
1−
P
i∈I z
i
t
¢
= 0 for all t.
Also in this case it is possible to prove that at the equilibrium the following
stochastic Euler inequality must be satisfied:
Duit−1(x
i
t−1)qt−1 ≥ Et−1[Duit(xit)(dt + qt)] for all t ≥ 1
and under some additional requirements (that are satisfied, for instance, in
the case of a finite number of states of nature at each date) also the following
condition must hold:©
Duit−1(x
i
t−1)qt−1 −Et−1[Duit(xit)(dt + qt)]
ª · (zit − kit) = 0
Again it is possible to introduce the distinction between the fundamental
value of an asset and the bubble component, in fact using the first relation
we can write:
Duit−1(x
i
t−1)qt−1 = Et−1[Du
i
t(x
i
t)(dt + qt)] + s
i
t−1
where the vectors st ≥ 0measure the deviation from the equality in the Euler
equation. Writing for simplicity Duit(x
i
t) = π
i
t and iterating the last equation
we get:
πitqt = Et
kX
r=1
πit+rdt+r +Et
k−1X
r=0
sit+r +Et[π
i
t+kqt+k]
and considering the limit for k that goes to ∞:
πitqt = Et
∞X
r=1
πit+rdt+r +Et
∞X
r=0
sit+r + lim
k→+∞
Et[πit+kqt+k]
and also:
qt =
1
πit
Et
∞X
r=1
πit+rdt+r +
1
πit
Et
∞X
r=0
sit+r +
1
πit
lim
k→+∞
Et[π
i
t+kqt+k]
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and again the price of the asset can be decomposed into 3 components:
qt = f
i
t +
ebit + bit
where the first term of the right-hand side is the fundamental value, the
second term is the bubble due to the violation of the Euler equation and the
third term is the asymptotic bubble.
At this point it is possible to obtain conditions that allow to rule out bub-
bles in the model with heterogeneous agents. A first result is the following:
Theorem 12 Let ((xi, zi), q) be an equilibrium; if the following conditions
are fulfilled:
(i) E
P∞
t=1Du
i
t(x
i
t)(x
i
t − wit)+ < +∞
(ii) agent i exhibits a uniformly bounded relative risk aversion, i.e. there
is some scalar R such that:
−D
2uit(x)x
Duit(x)
≤ R
for all x and all t ≥ 1
(iii) short-selling is prohibited, i.e. kit = 0
then:
lim
t→+∞
E[Duit(x
i
t)qt · zit+1] = 0
Proof. See Montrucchio (2001)
The last relation is a transversality condition at infinity, and it can be
used to obtain the following fundamental result, that allows to exclude the
presence of bubbles at an equilibrium:
Corollary 13 Under the assumptions of the previous Theorem, if there ex-
ists a sequence of times tn and some scalar ε > 0 such that:
zitn ≥ ε · 1
then the asymptotic bubble b
i
t is absent.
If, in addition, we have:
(i) zit > 0 almost surely
(ii) (dt + qt) · zit ≤Mtxit for some sequence Mt
then the bubble component vanishes and qt = f it .
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Proof. See Montrucchio (2001)
These are the central results concerning non-existence of speculative bub-
bles in the framework with heterogeneous agents. Furthermore, the transver-
sality condition at infinity obtained above can be used to establish sufficient
conditions of optimality, in fact the following result holds:
Proposition 14 Let (xi, zi) be an allocation for an economy where short-
selling is prohibited, and qt be a price process such that:
(i)
Duit−1(x
i
t−1)qt−1 ≥ Et−1[Duit(xit)(dt + qt)]©
Duit−1(x
i
t−1)qt−1 −Et−1[Duit(xit)(dt + qt)]
ª · zit = 0
for agent i and all t
(ii)
lim inf
t→+∞
E[Duit(x
i
t)qt · zit+1] = 0
Then the allocation (xi, zi) is weakly optimal.
If the stronger condition:
lim
t→+∞
E[Duit(x
i
t)qt · zit+1] = 0
is satisfied, then the allocation is strongly optimal.
This condition is useful to check the optimality of solutions when there
are bubbles caused by the violation of Euler equations (as it will be clear in
the next Section).
In conclusion, also the approach based on Euler equations shows that
bubbles are linked to very special situations, and therefore represent a fragile
phenomenon. To support this idea of marginality of bubbles it is possible to
give a series of examples in which speculative bubbles do appear, and from
which it emerges that, in order to obtain such a result, very special conditions
are needed. This is the object of the next Section.
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4 Examples of bubbles
In this Section some examples in which speculative bubbles do appear are
presented, in order to underline the very special conditions that allow the
presence of this phenomenon. In particular, the examples considered are the
following:
• a monetary model ”a’ la Bewley”;
• a general deterministic model;
• a stochastic model;
• a model with asymptotic bubble.
4.1 A monetary model ”a’ la Bewley”
The first example, based on the monetary model introduced by Bewley
(1980), considers a deterministic economy in which there is a unique as-
set traded at each date, the so-called fiat money, which gives no dividends.
There are two individuals (i = 1, 2) with the same preferences given by:
∞X
t=0
βtu(xit)
where β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1 and u(xit) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. Since in the Euler equations the functions uit appear,
in this situation we have uit(x
i
t) = β
tu(xit) and the problem solved by each
single agent is:
max
P∞
t=0 β
tu(xit)
s.t. xit + qt(z
i
t+1 − zit) ≤ dtzit + wit
zi0 = z
i
0
xit ≥ 0
zit ≥ kit
The endowments of the good for the two individuals are:
w1t =
½
w for t even
w for t odd
w2t =
½
w for t even
w for t odd
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(with w < w), i.e. they are symmetric across time, while the initial endow-
ments of the asset are:
z10 = 0 z
2
0 = 1
In addition, short-selling is prohibited (k1t = k
2
t = 0 ∀t) and, since there are
no dividends, dt = 0 ∀t. Sargent (1987) shows euristically that this model
has, together with the ”autarchic” equilibrium (where fiat money is never
valued, i.e. qt = 0, and each agent consumes his own endowment at each
trading date) another equilibrium in which fiat money has a positive price
and the consumption of each agent is of the form:
x1t =
½
x∗ for t even
x∗∗ for t odd
x2t =
½
x∗∗ for t even
x∗ for t odd
while the asset holding is of the form:
z1t =
½
0 for t even
m for t odd
z2t =
½
m for t even
0 for t odd
where m is the initial endowment of the asset.
The same result can be obtained using the approach of Euler equations. In
this case the strategy followed consists in looking for an equilibrium in which
the asset holding strategies are of a certain form; the budget constraints, then,
give the corresponding consumption values, and at this point the solution
candidate to be an equilibrium can be determined by means of the Euler
equations. Finally, the fact that the values found represent a true equilibrium
can be checked with the sufficient condition of optimality presented at the
end of Section 3.
In particular, in the model considered it is possible to look for an equilib-
rium in which the price of the asset is constant (qt = q > 0) and the holding
strategies of the two individuals are:
z1t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
z2t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
while from the budget constraints the equilibrium consumptions turn out to
be:
x1t =
½
w − q for t even
w + q for t odd
x2t =
½
w + q for t even
w − q for t odd
30
To determine the equilibrium price it is now possible to use Euler equa-
tions; for individual 1 we have:
u0t−1(x
1
t−1)q ≥ u0t(x1t )q
[u0t−1(x
1
t−1)q − u0t(x1t )q] · z1t = 0
from which, substituting the corresponding values for x and z, we get:
for t even
½
u0(w + q)q ≥ βu0(w − q)q
[u0(w + q)q − βu0(w − q)q] · 0 = 0
for t odd
½
u0(w − q)q ≥ βu0(w + q)q
[u0(w − q)q − βu0(w + q)q] · 1 = 0
i.e.:
u0(w + q) ≥ βu0(w − q) for t even
u0(w − q) = βu0(w + q) for t odd
In the same way we get for individual 2:
u0(w − q) = βu0(w + q) for t even
u0(w + q) ≥ βu0(w − q) for t odd
and, in conclusion, at an equilibrium the following conditions must hold:
u0(w − q) = βu0(w + q)
u0(w + q) ≥ βu0(w − q)
Substituting the first expression into the second, the latter becomes:
u0(w + q) ≥ βu0(w − q) = β2u0(w + q)
from which 1 ≥ β2, that is always true; in order to have an equilibrium,
hence, the first condition must hold, and to check the existence of a positive
price q that satisfies this relation we can consider the function:
f(q) = u(w − q) + βu(w + q)
that is strictly concave and is defined in the interval [0, w]. The only point of
maximum interior to this interval is characterized by the condition f 0(q) = 0,
that is precisely:
u0(w − q) = βu0(w + q)
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together with the conditions f 0(0) > 0 and f 0(w) < 0 (that are needed to
avoid that the maximum is on the boundary of the interval [0, w]), i.e.:
−u0(w) + βu0(w) > 0
−u0(0) + βu0(w + w) < 0
from which:
u0(w) < βu0(w)
βu0(w + w) < u0(0)
where the second relation is clearly satisfied assuming u0(0) = +∞. As a
consequence, the equilibrium value of q is the unique value q∗ that satisfies
the conditions:
u0(w − q) = βu0(w + q)
u0(w) < βu0(w)
The fact that the value q∗ found in this way is a true equilibrium can be
checked using the sufficient condition of optimality presented at the end of
Section 3. We have in this case:
lim
t→+∞
βtu0(xit)q
∗zit+1 = 0 provided β < 1
and ((xi, zi), q∗) is an equilibrium. In conclusion, in this model the following
result holds:
Proposition 15 The monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” considered has an equi-
librium with valued fiat money (monetary equilibrium). This equilibrium is
characterized by qt = q∗ for each t ≥ 0, where q∗ > 0 is the unique quantity
such that:
u0(w − q∗) = βu0(w + q∗)
u0(w) < βu0(w)
The corresponding equilibrium consumption allocations and portfolio alloca-
tions of the two individuals are the following:
x1t =
½
w − q∗ for t even
w + q∗ for t odd
z1t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
x2t =
½
w + q∗ for t even
w − q∗ for t odd z
2
t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
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In this case, therefore, at the equilibrium the two individuals exchange
one another, in every period, the unit of fiat money the economy is endowed
with. Each agent uses a part of his endowment of the consumption good
when it is high (w) to buy the unit of fiat money, and reduces consequently
the consumption of that period, while he sells the unit of fiat money when his
endowment of the consumption good is low (w), and in this way he increases
the consumption of that period. For this reason, the model is a consumption
smoothing model.
In this example the fundamental value of the asset is zero (because the
dividend at every date is zero), and the fact that at the equilibrium the price
of fiat money is positive means that this price involves a bubble component.
In particular, we have:
lim
t→+∞
βtu0(xit)q
∗ = 0
so that the asymptotic bubble is zero (i.e. b
i
t = 0), therefore in this case the
bubble is entirely due to the violation of the Euler equation (i.e. ebit > 0).
In fact, at each date one of the two individuals, alternatively, satisfies the
corresponding Euler equation as an equality, while the other individual sat-
isfies it as an inequality, and in this way there is ”violation” of this equation.
In terms of the general analysis presented in Section 3, the presence of the
bubble is due to the fact that agents cannot borrow against the value of their
future wealth, i.e. there is a borrowing constraint that turns out to be the
crucial element at the origin of the bubble.
Using the approach of Euler equations it is also possible to show that the
monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” has, together with the ”autarchic” equilib-
rium in which qt = 0 and the equilibrium with positive value of fiat money
(qt = q∗ > 0), a multiplicity of equilibria. In order to find this result we fix
a sequence of prices qt and we assume that the holding strategies of the two
individuals are the same as before, i.e.:
z1t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
z2t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
From the budget constraints we get the consumptions of the two agents,
given by:
x1t =
½
w − qt for t even
w + qt for t odd
x2t =
½
w + qt for t even
w − qt for t odd
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and, as before, the Euler equations that must hold at an equilibrium are:
u0(w − qt−1)qt−1 = βu0(w + qt)qt
u0(w + qt−1)qt−1 ≥ βu0(w − qt)qt
(5)
where the first relation holds for i = 1 at odd-numbered dates and for i = 2
at even-numbered dates, while the second relation holds for i = 1 at even-
numbered dates and for i = 2 at odd-numbered dates. Given an initial value
q0, the first relation determines a sequence of prices; this dynamics has the
two fix points q = 0 and q = q∗ found above, that represent two possible
equilibria of the model (the autarchic equilibrium and the equilibrium with
valued fiat money), but it is possible to show that there exist sequences of
prices which form other equilibria.
To obtain this result it is possible to consider a specific example in which
the utility function is:
uit(x
i
t) = β
t log xit
In this case the stationary price is:
q∗ =
βw − w
1 + β
while considering a sequence of prices qt the Euler equations that must hold
at equilibrium are:
1
w − qt−1
qt−1 =
β
w + qt
qt
1
w + qt−1
qt−1 ≥
β
w − qt
qt
from which:
qt =
wqt−1
βw − (1 + β)qt−1
(6)
qt ≤
wqt−1
βw + (1 + β)qt−1
(7)
Considering the graphics of the curves (6) and (7) it is possible to note that
both are strictly increasing and in the interval [0, q∗] the second lies above the
first, hence for any initial price q0 ∈ (0, q∗) there exists a sequence of asset
prices qt, decreasing to 0, which forms an equilibrium. As a consequence,
together with the autarchic equilibrium and the equilibrium with valued fiat
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money, there exist other equilibria, in which there is a bubble on the asset
price that disappears when the price converges to 0. Graphically we have:
and the results found can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 16 The monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” considered, in which
the utility function takes the specific form:
u(xit) = log x
i
t
has, together with the autarchic equilibrium (qt = 0) and the equilibrium with
constant positive price of fiat money (qt = q∗ > 0), a multiplicity of other
equilibria (that consist of sequences of asset prices qt decreasing to 0), one
for each initial value q0 ∈ (0, q∗).
The corresponding equilibrium consumption allocations and portfolio al-
locations of the two individuals are the following:
x1t =
½
w − qt for t even
w + qt for t odd
z1t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
x2t =
½
w + qt for t even
w − qt for t odd
z2t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
This result can then be extended to the general case (at least locally,
around q = 0), in fact the derivatives of the curves represented by the equa-
tions (5) at the origin are:µ
dqt
dqt−1
¶
0
=
u0(w)
βu0(w)
< 1 and
µ
dqt
dqt−1
¶
0
=
u0(w)
βu0(w)
>
1
β2
> 1
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therefore close to the origin the second curve lies above the first, and if the
latter rises monotonically we have the same situation described in the case
of logarithmic utility, and a multiplicity of equilibria arises. In the general
case there is also another possibility, i.e. it is possible for the first curve to
be ”backward bending”; considering the derivative of this curve at q = q∗ we
have: µ
dqt
dqt−1
¶
q∗
=
u0(w − q∗)− u00(w − q∗)q∗
β [u0(w + q∗) + u00(w + q∗)q∗]
and a sufficient condition for the curve to be backward bending is that this
derivative is negative, i.e. (since the numerator is always positive):
u0(w + q∗) + u00(w + q∗)q∗ < 0 (8)
This can happen for instance for the family of utility functions of the form
u(xit) =
(xit)
α
α with α < 0 (isoelastic utilities, for α → 0 we obtain the
logarithmic case). In this example after some computations we get that
condition (8) holds for:
α < −w(1 + β
1
1−α )
wβ
1
1−α − w
and we have a situation of this type:
In conclusion, the analysis based on the approach of Euler equations shows
that the monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” has, together with an autarchic
equilibrium (that is a no-trade equilibrium, in which the price of fiat money
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is q = 0) another stationary equilibrium, in which fiat money is valued (qt =
q∗ > 0). In this case, since the fundamental value of fiat money is always
zero, this implies the existence of a speculative bubble, and as long as the
discount factor β is less than 1 this bubble is due to the violation of the
Euler equation. In addition, in the special case of logarithmic utility (and
also in the general case, locally around q = 0) a further result is that for
every initial value q0 ∈ (0, q∗) the model has an equilibrium represented by
a decreasing sequence of prices qt which converges to 0. The conclusion is
that a multiplicity of equilibria exists, and this equilibria involve a bubble
component (due to the violation of the Euler equation) that then vanishes
as qt → 0.
4.2 A general deterministic model
The second example considered is a generalization, in the deterministic case,
of the first one. There are again two individuals with identical preferences:
∞X
t=0
βtu(xit)
but in this case the endowments at the beginning of each period are generic,
equal respectively to w1t and w
2
t . Also in this example the asset available is
fiat money (in fixed net supply of one unit at all dates), in addition short-
selling is prohibited and we assume that the strategies of the two individuals
concerning the amounts of the asset held in equilibrium are of ”bang-bang”
type, i.e.:
z1t ∈ {0, 1} z2t = 1− z1t
At this point, if qt is a sequence of equilibrium prices Euler equations must
hold; for individual 1 these conditions are:
u0(x1t )qt ≥ βu0(x1t+1)qt+1
[u0(x1t )qt − βu0(x1t+1)qt+1] · z1t+1 = 0
and for individual 2 they are:
u0(x2t )qt ≥ βu0(x2t+1)qt+1
[u0(x2t )qt − βu0(x2t+1)qt+1] · z2t+1 = 0
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Given this general structure it is possible to obtain an interesting result
considering a sequence of ”times of switching”. First of all the following
definition holds:
Definition 17 A sequence of times of switching is a sequence T = {0 = T0, T1, T2, ...}
with 0 < T1 < T2 < ... that satisfies the following conditions (for i = 1, 2):
(i) ziTn 6= ziTn+1 ∀n
(ii) zit is constant ∀t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1) ∀n
so that the ” times of switching” are the dates at which the individuals
exchange one another the unit of fiat money present in the economy. Given
the initial values (z10, z
2
0) and a ”time switching” T , this determines a strategy
(z1t , z
2
t ), and with reference to this aspect it is possible to prove the following
result (where i denotes one individual and bi the other one):
Proposition 18 If (z1t , z
2
t ) is an optimal strategy and T = {0, T1, T2, ...} is
the corresponding time switching, then the following relation must hold:
u0(wit+1)
u0(wit)
≥ u
0(wbit+1)
u0(wbit) ∀t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1 − 2] 6= ∅ ∀n
and furthermore:
zit+1 = 1 z
bi
t+1 = 0 ∀t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1 − 2]
In fact, given an interval [Tn, Tn+1 − 2] 6= ∅ , on this interval the values
z1t and z
2
t are constant, i.e. z
1
t+1 = z
1
t and z
2
t+1 = z
2
t , and as a consequence
from the budget constraints of the two individuals it is possible to get the
consumptions x1t = w
1
t and x
2
t = w
2
t . If we then assume that i is the agent
for which zit = 1 and bi is the agent for which zbit = 0 , then the corresponding
Euler equations are:
u0(wit)qt = βu
0(wit+1)qt+1
u0(wbit)qt ≥ βu0(wbit+1)qt+1
that hold ∀t ∈ [Tn, Tn+1 − 2]. From these equations (assuming that qt 6= 0
∀t) we get:
qt
qt+1
=
βu0(wit+1)
u0(wit)
≥ βu
0(wbit+1)
u0(wbit)
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that is the conclusion.
From this result it is possible to obtain in particular a sufficient condition
for the existence of a ”switching” in every period, we have in fact:
Proposition 19 If z10 = 1 and z
2
0 = 0 , then a sufficient condition for a
switching in every period is given by the relations:
u0(w1t+1)
u0(w1t )
<
u0(w2t+1)
u0(w2t )
for t even
u0(w2t+1)
u0(w2t )
<
u0(w1t+1)
u0(w1t )
for t odd
and in this case we have:
z1t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
z2t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
In fact, to have a switching in every period we need T = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}
i.e. T1 = 1, T2 = 2, T3 = 3... and therefore [Tn, Tn+1 − 2] = ∅ ∀n. Assuming
that z10 = 1 and z
2
0 = 0 , from the previous Proposition it follows that, in
order to have [0, T1− 2] = ∅ (so that T1 = 1), it is sufficient that the relation
stated in that Proposition doesn’t hold, i.e. it is sufficient to have:
u0(w11)
u0(w10)
<
u0(w21)
u0(w20)
In this way at time t = 1 we have z11 = 0 and z
2
1 = 1, if we now assume:
u0(w22)
u0(w21)
<
u0(w12)
u0(w11)
then [1, T2 − 2] = ∅ (so that T2 = 2), i.e. there is a new switching and at
time t = 2 we have z12 = 1 and z
2
2 = 0 and so on. By proceeding in this way
we get T1 = 1, T2 = 2, T3 = 3 that is the result of the Proposition.
An example of application of this result can be obtained considering the
case in which there are two individuals with identical preferences given by:
u(xit) = log x
i
t
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while their endowments are given by:
w1t =
½
Aρt for t even
Bρt for t odd
w2t =
½
Bρt for t even
Aρt for t odd
i.e. they grow at the same average rate but fluctuate over time in a deter-
ministic fashion (where ρ is the growth factor and 0 < A < B). The initial
quantities of the asset (again fiat money, so that the dividend equals zero in
every period) held by the two agents are:
z10 = 1 z
2
0 = 0
and hence in this case the individual with the smaller endowment in period
0 (agent 1) has all of the asset available in the economy. In addition, short-
selling is prohibited, i.e. the individuals cannot borrow.
First of all it is possible to verify that in this example the sufficient condi-
tion that guarantees the existence of a switching in every period is satisfied;
this condition becomes (both for t even and for t odd):
A
B
<
B
A
that is clearly verified, since A < B. As a consequence, in this economy there
is ”switching” in every period and the portfolio allocations of equilibrium are:
z1t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
z2t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
while the corresponding consumption allocations are:
x1t =
½
Aρt + qt for t even
Bρt − qt for t odd
x2t =
½
Bρt − qt for t even
Aρt + qt for t odd
In order to determine the equilibrium price we can then consider the Euler
equations, that are:
qt
Bρt − qt
=
βqt+1
Aρt+1 + qt+1
qt
Aρt + qt
≥ βqt+1
Bρt+1 − qt+1
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Looking for a solution of the form:
qt = cρt
we get:
c =
βB −A
1 + β
and therefore:
qt =
βB −A
1 + β
ρt
provided A < βB. This is the equilibrium price and also in this case the
fact that this is a true equilibrium can be checked by means of the sufficient
condition of optimality, we have in fact:
lim
t→+∞
βtu0(xit)qtz
i
t+1 = 0 provided β < 1
and ((xi, zi), q) is an equilibrium. The corresponding consumption allocations
are:
x1t =
(
β(A+B)
1+β ρ
t for t even
A+B
1+β ρ
t for t odd
x2t =
(
A+B
1+β ρ
t for t even
β(A+B)
1+β ρ
t for t odd
In conclusion, the results obtained can be summarized in the following Propo-
sition:
Proposition 20 The model considered has an equilibrium with valued fiat
money, characterized by:
qt =
βB −A
1 + β
ρt
with A < βB. The corresponding equilibrium consumption allocations and
portfolio allocations of the two individuals are the following:
x1t =
(
β(A+B)
1+β ρ
t for t even
A+B
1+β ρ
t for t odd
z1t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
x2t =
(
A+B
1+β ρ
t for t even
β(A+B)
1+β ρ
t for t odd
z2t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
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Also in this case the fundamental value of fiat money is zero, while the
equilibrium price qt is positive, hence there is a bubble. In particular, if β < 1
we have:
lim
t→+∞
βtu0(xit)qt = 0
i.e. the asymptotic component is zero and the bubble is due entirely to the
violation of the Euler equation.
The origin of this bubble is represented by the short-sales constraint. In
fact, in even periods agent 1 is poor because his endowment is relatively low,
and he owns all of the asset present in the economy at the beginning of the
period, that he then sells to agent 2 (in order to smooth his consumption).
The problem is represented by the fact that he would like to sell even more
of the asset (and agent 2 would like to buy it), but he cannot because of
the short-sales constraint; the same is true for agent 2 in odd periods. In
conclusion, no agent can permanently reduce his holdings because of the
short-sales constraint, and furthermore agents’ endowments grow as fast as
the bubble, so that the individuals can always buy the asset when they are
wealthy. These elements determine an increase in the price of the asset
(whose fundamental value is zero) and turn out to be the bubble producing
factors in this economy.
4.3 A stochastic model
The third example presented is an extension of the previous ones (that are
deterministic models) to the stochastic setting. In the economy examined, at
each date t there is realized a random state st ∈ {ξ, η}, following a Markov
process with transition probabilities:
π(st+1 = ξ | st = η) = π(st+1 = η | st = ξ) = π
π(st+1 = ξ | st = ξ) = π(st+1 = η | st = η) = 1− π
where 0 < π < 1, given an initial condition s0 ∈ {ξ, η}. In this case the state
space is Ω = {ξ, η}N and the generic node st of the tree that can be used to
describe the uncertainty in this model is identified with a sequence:
st = {s0, s1, ..., st} ∈ {ξ, η}t+1
At each node there is a single consumption good and a single asset that is
traded, again represented by fiat money (in fixed net supply of one unit at all
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dates). The economy consists of two individuals with identical preferences
given by:
E
" ∞X
t=0
βtu(xit)
#
with 0 < β < 1 and endowments:
w1(st) =
½
w if st = ξ
w if st = η
w2(st) =
½
w if st = ξ
w if st = η
with w < w, and in addition one of the two individuals is initially endowed
with one unit of fiat money, and the other with zero units (which of them
has the asset does not matter). Finally, in this economy borrowing is not
possible.
As usual it is possible to look for an equilibrium in which the asset holding
strategy of the two agents is of ”bang-bang” type, more precisely:
z1(st) =
½
0 if st = ξ
1 if st = η
z2(st) =
½
1 if st = ξ
0 if st = η
and in this model it is convenient to write the budget constraints in the form:
x1(st) + q(st)[z1(st)− z1(st−1)] = w1(st)
x2(st) + q(st)[z2(st)− z2(st−1)] = w2(st)
In this case, then, we assume that equilibrium prices are of the form:
q(st) = Φ(| zi(st)− zi(st−1) |)
and since | zi(st) − zi(st−1) | can assume only the values 0 and 1 there are
two possible prices:
q(st)
½
Φ(0) = q(st−2, ξ, ξ) = q(st−2, η, η) = q∗∗
Φ(1) = q(st−2, ξ, η) = q(st−2, η, ξ) = q∗
As usual it is possible to write the Euler equations (that in this case are true
stochastic Euler equations). For agent 1 we get:
u0(x1(st−1))q(st−1) ≥ βπ(st = ξ | st−1)u0(x1(st−1, ξ))q(st−1, ξ) +
+ βπ(st = η | st−1)u0(x1(st−1, η))q(st−1, η)
[u0(x1(st−1))q(st−1)− βπ(st = ξ | st−1)u0(x1(st−1, ξ))q(st−1, ξ)−
−βπ(st = η | st−1)u0(x1(st−1, η))q(st−1, η)] · z1(st−1) = 0
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and for agent 2 we have:
u0(x2(st−1))q(st−1) ≥ βπ(st = ξ | st−1)u0(x2(st−1, ξ))q(st−1, ξ) +
+ βπ(st = η | st−1)u0(x2(st−1, η))q(st−1, η)
[u0(x2(st−1))q(st−1)− βπ(st = ξ | st−1)u0(x2(st−1, ξ))q(st−1, ξ)−
−βπ(st = η | st−1)u0(x2(st−1, η))q(st−1, η)] · z2(st−1) = 0
After some computations we get that in every state st the following relations
must hold:
u0(w − q∗)q∗ = βπu0(w + q∗)q∗ + β(1− π)u0(w)q∗∗
u0(w)q∗∗ = βπu0(w + q∗)q∗ + β(1− π)u0(w)q∗∗
u0(w + q∗)q∗ ≥ βπu0(w − q∗)q∗ + β(1− π)u0(w)q∗∗
u0(w)q∗∗ ≥ βπu0(w − q∗)q∗ + β(1− π)u0(w)q∗∗
Their solution is given by the values (that are unique) q∗ and q∗∗ that satisfy
the relations:
u0(w − q∗)
u0(w + q∗)
=
βπ
1− β(1− π)
q∗∗ =
u0(w − q∗)
u0(w)
q∗
under the limitations:
β2π(1− π)
1− β + βπ(1− βπ) ≤
u0(w)
u0(w)
<
βπ
1− β(1− π)
It is then possible to determine the equilibrium allocations, and the results
can be summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 21 Under the assumption:
β2π(1− π)
1− β + βπ(1− βπ) ≤
u0(w)
u0(w)
<
βπ
1− β(1− π)
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the stochastic model considered has an equilibrium with valued fiat money
given by the following processes:
if



st−1 = ξ
st = ξ
then



x1(st) = w z1(st) = 0
q(st) = q∗∗
x2(st) = w z2(st) = 1
if



st−1 = ξ
st = η
then



x1(st) = w − q∗ z1(st) = 1
q(st) = q∗
x2(st) = w + q∗ z2(st) = 0
if



st−1 = η
st = ξ
then



x1(st) = w + q∗ z1(st) = 0
q(st) = q∗
x2(st) = w − q∗ z2(st) = 1
if



st−1 = η
st = η
then



x1(st) = w z1(st) = 1
q(st) = q∗∗
x2(st) = w z2(st) = 0
where q∗ and q∗∗ are the unique quantities that satisfy the relations:
u0(w − q∗)
u0(w + q∗)
=
βπ
1− β(1− π)
q∗∗ =
u0(w − q∗)
u0(w)
q∗
and q∗∗ > q∗.
The fact that this is a true equilibrium, once again, can be verified by
means of the sufficient condition of optimality presented at the end of Section
3, we have in this situation:
lim
t→+∞
βtE
£
u0(xi(st))q(st)zi(st+1)
¤
= 0
and therefore the allocation found is optimal.
In this case at the equilibrium the entire money supply, at the end of
trading at each node, is held by the individual that had the higher endowment
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(w) at that node, while the individual with the lower endowment (w) spends
during the period any money that he holds at the beginning of the period.
The exchange value of fiat money, then, is q∗ if the agent that holds the entire
money supply at the beginning of the period is the agent with endowment
w, while it is q∗∗ if the agent with the money has endowment w. Again
there is a bubble, as the equilibrium price of fiat money is positive while its
fundamental value is zero, and since we have:
lim
t→+∞
βtE
£
u0(xi(st))q(st)
¤
= 0 provided β < 1
the asymptotic component of the bubble is zero and the bubble is due to the
violation of the Euler equation (by each of the two individuals, alternatively,
in each period).
4.4 An example of asymptotic bubble
All the previous examples are characterized by the fact that the presence of
a speculative bubble in equilibrium is linked to the violation of the Euler
equation. It is therefore interesting to build an example in which, on the
contrary, the bubble arises even if Euler equation is not violated.
A simple case is given by the monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” considered
in the first example, in which agents don’t discount the future, so that β = 1.
In this situation the equilibrium is characterized by the conditions:
u0(w − q∗) = u0(w + q∗)
u0(w) < u0(w)
from which:
w − q∗ = w + q∗
w > w
that is:
q∗ =
w − w
2
w > w
and then:
w − q∗ = w + w
2
= w + q∗
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and finally:
x1t = x
2
t =
w + w
2
∀t
while the holding strategies are the same as in the case in which β < 1 (the
two agents hold alternatively the unit of the asset in even periods and in odd
periods). In this case we have:
lim inf
t→+∞
u0(xit)q
∗zit+1 = 0
so that the allocation (xi, zi) is weakly optimal and the solution found is an
equilibrium, nevertheless this allocation is not strongly optimal because:
lim sup
t→+∞
u0(xit)q
∗zit+1 > 0
In this example the Euler equations are always satisfied as equalities, in
fact since β = 1 they are:
u0(w − q) = u0(w + q)
u0(w + q) ≥ u0(w − q)
and this implies that they reduce to the same relation:
u0(w − q) = u0(w + q)
and are satisfied as equalities. In this example, therefore, ebit = 0, i.e. the
bubble component due to the violation of the Euler equation is zero, and as
a consequence the bubble on the asset price is of asymptotic kind, we have
in fact:
b
i
t =
1
Duit(x
i
t)
lim
k→+∞
Duit+k(x
i
t+k)q
∗ = q∗
The results obtained can be summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 22 The monetary model ”a’ la Bewley” in which agents don’t
discount the future (i.e. β = 1) has an equilibrium with valued fiat money
where the price of the asset is:
q∗ =
w − w
2
∀t
47
with w > w. The corresponding equilibrium consumption allocations and
portfolio allocations of the two individuals are the following:
x1t =
w + w
2
∀t z1t =
½
0 for t even
1 for t odd
x2t =
w + w
2
∀t z2t =
½
1 for t even
0 for t odd
Furthermore, in this case Euler equations are never violated, and the bubble
on the price of the asset is entirely of asymptotic kind.
The result concerning the nature of the bubble term extends to the other
examples involving fiat money that have been considered, whenever β = 1.
The conclusion is that in models with valued fiat money of the type examined,
if 0 < β < 1 the bubble component on the price of the asset is due to the
violation of the Euler equation, while if β = 1 the bubble is of asymptotic
kind.
5 Conclusions
The conclusion that emerges from the analysis of the models examined is
that the phenomenon of speculative bubbles on asset prices in intertemporal
general equilibrium models is negligible, because it can arise only under quite
special circumstances. This is confirmed also by the examples analysed, in
which the presence of such bubbles is linked to particular situations (the
violation of Euler equations, or of the hypotheses on which the models are
based, and since these hypotheses are satisfied by a wide class of economies,
their violation represents a rather special circumstance).
In the models presented it is assumed that individuals use all the avail-
able information to make their predictions (and, furthermore, that these
predictions are based on the correct model of the economy), i.e. that they
have rational expectations. This assumption, therefore, implies that the price
of a security is equal, in equilibrium, to its fundamental value (the present
value of its future dividend stream), and deviations from this value are only
occasional.
In reality, there are periods in which this is not true, and the prices of some
assets far exceed their fundamental values. These periods are the so-called
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speculative booms, in which speculative bubbles on the prices of the assets
arise. There is therefore an evident contrast between these episodes and
the conclusions of the theory. A possible explanation is represented by the
fact that, during the periods of speculative boom, there is a ”breakdown” of
rational expectations, on which the theory is based. With reference to this
aspect, it is possible to observe that the crucial characteristic of the asset
markets is represented by their liquidity. In fact, a long-lived security can
be purchased for two reasons: the first is the possibility to receive the future
stream of dividends that it offers, the second is the possibility to resale it
subsequently and to obtain a capital gain. When an agent buys an asset for
the first reason, he will never accept to pay more for it than the present value
of its future dividend stream, but when he buys an asset for the second reason
what matters in assessing its value is what other agents will be ready to pay
for it later. If agents can evaluate the future dividends of the asset with
reasonable precision, and believe that all other agents can make a similar
evaluation, then they have no reason to believe that the price of the asset at
any future date will differ from the value of its remaining dividend stream,
and hence they will not accept to pay for the asset more than the present
value of its future dividends, even when they buy the asset in order to resale
it later. In some circumstances, anyway, there can appear elements (for
instance an innovation or a new discovery, significative changes in techniques
of production or other circumstances of this kind) whose consequences may
be important but whose probability of success is difficult to evaluate. The
result is that in this case individuals don’t know how to assess future values of
the assets linked to these new elements, and they know that the other agents
face the same difficulties. The consequence is that it is no longer rational
for them to believe that the price of a security should equal its fundamental
value, and therefore the hypothesis of rational expectations disappears.
In this context it often happens that new investors enter the market
(aware of the possibility of these innovations to create gains in the future)
and in this way begin to give up prices; this confirms the expectations of
these individuals and we have an initial phase of rising prices. When this
process has continued for a while, the information concerning the possibil-
ity of consistent gains in the future spreads among a broader segment of
investors, that in turn enter the market. The more investors are attracted
to the market, the more the prices rise and the more expectations of rising
prices become self-fulfilling. At this point agents’ expectations of rising prices
begin to feed on themselves and cease to be related to the rational valuation
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made by an agent who buys the asset in order to receive its future dividend
stream. It is precisely in this moment that the assumption of rational expec-
tations breaks down, because agents recognize that there are other agents
in the market who are not pricing the assets by their fundamental values,
but are basing their valuation on the upward intertia of the market. This is
the phase in which speculative bubbles reach their maximum level. Finally,
after this process has continued for a certain period, individuals begin to
have doubts about the possibility of the market to continue this phase of
rising prices, therefore they start selling the assets and there is a phase of
decreasing prices, until the prices of the assets reach once again a level that
corresponds approximately to their fundamental values.
Outside of the periods in which the rational expectations behavior of
the individuals breaks down, therefore, the price of an asset is equal to its
fundamental value, and the results of the models illustrated are valid. It is
in this way that the conclusions of the theory are consistent with the reality.
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